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1. Introduction 
The ambition shown by the European Union (EU) to transform its energy sector and to provide 
consumers with affordable, sustainable, and secure energy poses a number of challenges to the 
European electricity system. All three pillars of the EU’s energy policy:  
• Competition,  
• Mitigation of climate change, and 
• Security of energy supply 
impact notably the future development of European grid infrastructure. In particular, the anticipated (by 
2030) 32 per cent share of renewables in final energy consumption (European Commission 2018c) and 
the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 80–95 per cent by 2050 (European Commission 2011) 
will require extensive infrastructure investments at the European level.  
Nevertheless, the future of the European electricity system bears numerous uncertainties. For example, 
the amount and location of generation, the way in which consumption will develop, the economic 
framework conditions, and advances in technology, are all ambiguous factors with a potentially strong 
impact on infrastructure needs and investment decisions. In order to address these future uncertainties, 
the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) was given the task 
of developing a set of scenarios within the two-yearly Ten-Year Network Development Plan (TYNDP). 
The TYNDP explores different plausible future paths and facilitates the assessment of the hardware of 
the European electricity system – namely transmission and interconnector projects – under various 
conditions. In this capacity, the TYNDP is viewed by the European Commission (EC) as the central 
planning tool for the advancement of European grid infrastructure (Interview 19). The TYNDP is an 
expertise-driven technical plan developed by experts from Transmission System Operators (TSOs). 
However, it also is part of the wider context of European energy and climate goals and is therefore 
subject to political expectations. This duality constitutes an interesting case for researching the role of 
political agendas in highly technical policy areas. 
This paper analyses the TYNDP and investigates where in the European energy policymaking arena it 
is located, by relating it to EU energy policy goals. Moreover, the research examines how stakeholders 
utilize the TYNDP and what role they ascribe to it. Ultimately, the question of whether the TYNDP is 
effective in identifying future uncertainties and related challenges for the European electricity system is 
scrutinized. With regard to methodology, this research applies a combination of document analysis and 
expert interviews with stakeholders engaged in the TYNDP development process. 
The paper contends that both an existing policy congruence and the strong link to the Projects of 
Common Interest (PCI) process limit the effectiveness of the TYNDP as a strategic policy planning tool 
and also influence the way in which stakeholders utilize it. In order to improve the plan’s effectiveness, 
the TYNDP should be more closely connected to the software component of the electricity system – 
namely the design and regulation of the future electricity market – to allow for a holistic evaluation of 
infrastructure projects. In addition, a fundamental reform of European electricity market design and 
regulation at EU-level is necessary, to enable the identification and allocation of future infrastructure 
projects. 
The research is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces the key actors of European energy 
policy. The next section then provides an overview of the three pillars of EU energy policy and explores 
the impact of each on the European electricity system, with a focus on the infrastructure component. 
Analyses of the TYNDPs from 2012 to 2018, together with an examination of their relationship to EU 
energy policy goals, are found in the following section. Section 5 investigates how the TYNDP and its 
scenarios are utilized by various stakeholders. The results of the analysis are presented in Section 6. 
A concluding section summarizes the paper’s findings.  
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2. Principal actors in European electricity policy 
European electricity policy is determined by a few key actors who also decide the general energy and 
climate policy of the European Union. These principal actors are (Schubert et al. 2016): 
• the European Commission (EC),  
• European member states – through the European Council and the Council of the European 
Union,  
• the European Parliament (EP),  
• the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).  
However, in electricity policy particularly, two additional actors play a vital role in the development of 
policies at the European level (Buchan and Keay 2015), namely:  
• the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), 
• ENTSO-E.  
2.1 European Commission 
The EC is the central promoter of reforms in the European electricity system (Buchan and Keay 2015). 
Throughout the 1990s and until the third liberalization package in 2009, European electricity policy was 
focused on liberalization and marketization, which are the Commission’s key competences (Talus and 
Aalto 2017; Schmidt 1998; Domanico 2007; Eikeland 2011).  
Through its right of initiative, the Commission assumes the role of a policy entrepreneur and stimulates 
the development of policies at the European level (Maltby 2013). In electricity policy, this became 
especially apparent in the EC-driven liberalization of the European electricity industry. Besides its right 
to initiate policies, the Commission has also made use of antitrust investigations against national energy 
champions, and also of infringement proceedings against a number of member states. The result of the 
Commission’s efforts were the energy packages that were passed in 1996, 2003, and 2009. 
Fundamentally, these reforms re-structured the sector and resulted in a new mode of EU electricity 
policymaking (Buchan 2015; Eikeland 2011). In addition, the Commission – through white papers, policy 
proposals, and communications – asserts its ideas and policy objectives into the European energy 
policy discussion. Examples of this are the 2020 Energy Strategy (European Commission 2010), the 
Energy Roadmap 2050 (European Commission 2011), and, more recently, the Energy Union proposal 
(European Commission 2015b) and the Winter Package proposals (European Commission 2016a). 
Within the Commission (since the Treaty of Lisbon came into force) the Directorate General for Energy 
(DG ENER) is principally in charge of energy and electricity policy. However, overlaps exist – mainly 
with the Directorate Generals for Competition (COMP), Climate (CLIMA), Enterprise and Industry 
(ENTR), and Environment (ENV) (Schubert et al. 2016). In 2014, EC President Jean-Claude Juncker 
appointed Maroš Šefčovič as Commission Vice President for Energy Union (Juncker 2014). His main 
tasks – the realization of both the Energy Union (see Section 3) and a progressive climate policy – are 
to be carried out by coordinating the work of the different DGs involved in energy matters.  
Notwithstanding the more active role that the EU member states have assumed in European energy 
policy since the 2000s (see Section 2.2), the Commission has managed to largely retain its policy 
initiative capabilities. This is due to an increasingly cooperative working relationship with the European 
Council (achieved through both formal and informal procedures), as well as to the EC’s technical 
expertise, on which the member states rely. For instance, the Commission’s policy goals are often 
embedded in the European Council conclusions that address energy policy matters (Thaler 2016).  
Ultimately, the EC oversees the progress made by member states in reaching the 2030 targets for 
renewable energy and energy efficiency, and also acts as a policy coordinator (Talus and Aalto 2017).  
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2.2 EU member states 
Historically, the member states have been reluctant to cooperate with each other and create a common 
European electricity policy. National governments feared a loss of sovereignty in this strategic sector, 
and were unwilling to transfer competences to the European level (Eising and Jabko 2001). An example 
of this unwillingness is the lengthy negotiation process that preceded the adoption of the first electricity 
liberalization package in 1996. Only through applying the EU’s competition law did the EC persuade 
member state governments to take the first step toward a European electricity policy (Schmidt 1998).  
On the one hand, sovereignty over national electricity policy lies with member states. According to 
Article 194 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the choice of the design of 
energy structure, electricity generation mix, exploitation of natural resources for energy generation, 
external energy relations, and taxation are all exclusive competences of the member state governments 
(Talus and Aalto 2017).  
On the other hand, the general approach of member states towards the idea of European energy and 
electricity policies changed in the 2000s. The decreasing production of European natural gas and oil, 
the economic crisis in 2007/8, and tensions with external energy partners in the form of the Russia–
Ukraine gas disputes in 2006/2009 resulted in a reassessed approach. As the European Commission 
lacked the necessary competences, the European Council became the primary forum in which 
governments were able to engineer a collaborative European energy policy in an intergovernmental 
mode (Thaler 2016). To elaborate, in the European Council meetings of 2005 (Council of the European 
Union 2005), 2007 (Council of the European Union 2007), and 2013 (European Council 2013), EU 
member states agreed on the three interlinked objectives of a European energy policy (competitiveness, 
sustainability, and security of energy supply) and generally consented to the fact that European energy 
issues should be tackled by a more integrated approach (Thaler 2016).   
Close cooperation between the European Commission and member states remains in place. For 
instance, the Energy Union – as proposed by the Commission (European Commission 2015b) and 
endorsed by the European Council (European Council 2015) – was developed to ensure close 
collaboration, without shifting sovereignty from the national to the European level (Pellerin-Carlin 2017; 
Thaler 2016).  
Another institution where member states develop and discuss energy and electricity policies is the 
Council of the European Union (the Council). The Council’s Transport, Telecommunications and Energy 
Council (TTE) deals with energy matters at the ministerial level of member state governments. Since 
the TTE meets regularly, representatives of member states are constantly exchanging ideas. Within the 
TTE, the Working Party on Energy deals mostly with technical issues, such as electricity 
interconnections and security of supply, which are then proposed to the Council and to the EP for 
potentially binding decisions (Schubert et al. 2016).    
2.3 European Parliament 
The significance of the EP in EU decision-making procedures has increased in line with the 1993 
Maastricht Treaty; its impact on energy policy in general, and on electricity policy specifically, can be 
seen mainly through its function as a co-legislator, together with the European Council (Talus and Aalto 
2017). The Parliament reviews EC proposals and then discusses amendments in its Committees. The 
proposals are then adopted in the plenary sessions. This process can prove to be lengthy; this is 
because the EP, in its current composition, is fragmented and, with regard to energy policy, there are 
divisions that run through both party and member state affiliations (van Hulten and Sitter 2017). In 
addition, the Parliament can also adopt non-binding resolutions and opinions, in which it expresses 
concerns or identifies policy issues to be addressed by the Commission. For example, in its 2015 
resolution Towards a European Energy Union (European Parliament 2015), the EP comments on the 
Commission’s Energy Union Package (European Commission 2015b). The EP highlights, among other 
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things, the importance of investments in the European electricity market and the necessity of electricity 
interconnections. 
2.4 Court of Justice of the European Union 
While the CJEU is not a proactive policymaker, its rulings and definitions have shaped European 
electricity policy substantially, and they continue to do so (Schubert et al. 2016). For example, in 1994 
the EC brought competition infringement procedures to the Court, which then defined electricity as a 
good which is subject to internal market rules (case C-393/92); this in turn put pressure on member 
states to adopt the first liberalization package (Schmidt 1998). Recently, in 2011 and following the 
Commission’s intention to enforce the third liberalization package, 15 infringement procedures against 
member states were brought before the Court urging governments to speed up implementation (Talus 
and Aalto 2017).  
In addition, the CJEU validated national subsidies for renewable energy (case C-573/12) and thus 
potentially obstructed the further development of the internal market for electricity (Schubert et al. 2016).  
2.5 ACER 
The Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators was established by the Treaty of Lisbon, and its 
competences were defined in the third liberalization package. It provides a coordination and cooperation 
platform for national regulatory authorities (NRAs) in both the electricity and gas sectors. As a formal 
EU agency, it advises the Commission on technical issues, and is required to promote the completion 
of the internal energy market, through activities such as coordinating the creation of European network 
rules (Labelle 2017). The agency monitors the cross-border activities of TSOs and plays a crucial role 
in advancing the European electricity market via setting a framework of guidelines for pan-European 
network codes (Buchan 2015). 
However, ACER is not itself a European regulator, and its authority over NRAs is limited to cross-border 
connections and regulations between member states. Regulatory authority at the national level remains 
with the NRAs. As a result, ACER chiefly contributes to European electricity making through its opinions, 
recommendations, and market monitoring reports (Hancher and Salerno 2017).  
The EC’s Clean Energy Package (alias the Winter Package, European Commission 2016a) foresees a 
strengthened role for ACER. The Agency should gain greater power to oblige member states to 
cooperate, and also to maximize the utilization of interconnections. In addition, Regional Operation 
Centres (ROCs) for TSOs, as proposed by the Commission, would be monitored and coordinated by 
ACER (Buchan and Keay 2016).1 
2.6 ENTSO-E 
The European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity coordinates the completion 
and functioning of the internal market for electricity and was institutionalized in the third liberalization 
package (European Parliament and Council of the European Union 2009b). The Network determines 
European cross-border infrastructure investments and also promotes electricity grid interconnections 
and the physical functioning of the market (Schubert et al. 2016). For instance, ENTSO-E designs the 
two-yearly TYNDPs and the European Network Codes, in order to facilitate the functioning and 
advancement of the European electricity market (Vinois 2017). In this capacity, ENTSO-E provides the 
technical expertise for the integration of member states’ electricity markets (see Section 4.1). 
Unlike ACER, ENTSO-E is not an EU agency. It is, rather, a member-based organization. Its members 
are the TSOs from EU states as well as from neighbouring countries (in total 43 TSOs from 36 countries, 
ENTSO-E 2018a). With regard to its institutional position: ENTSO-E is monitored by ACER and its 
                                                     
 
1 The Clean Energy Package has not yet (December 2018) been translated into EU legislation.  
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proposals are submitted to the Commission for approval. In addition, the EC sets the priorities for the 
European Network Codes (European Parliament and Council of the European Union 2009b).  
The Clean Energy Package (European Commission 2016a) envisions extended competences for 
ENTSO-E, for instance with regard to adequacy assessment and capacity remuneration mechanisms. 
Moreover, the anticipated establishment of ROCs will add an institutional layer between ENTSO-E and 
the TSOs (Hancher and Salerno 2017). However, TSOs are sceptical about the creation of ROCs as 
this would transfer their competences to a superior level and raise questions of political accountability 
in the event of a blackout (Interviews 12, 15). 
 
3. EU energy and electricity policies 
European energy policy principally rests on three pillars: provision of affordable energy for households 
and industry, mitigation of climate change, and a secure supply. In order to reach these goals, the EU 
aims respectively to: finalize the internal energy market, decrease greenhouse gas emissions and boost 
energy efficiency, and reduce energy import dependency and diversify suppliers (Buchan 2009; Helm 
2012; Schubert et al. 2016).   
These three objectives, however, were developed neither simultaneously nor harmoniously. In the 
1990s, EU competition law and, subsequently, EU environmental policy, shaped the European energy 
policy agenda (Schmidt 1998; Biesenbender 2015). Nevertheless, competences in energy policy 
remained exclusively at the member state level until the first liberalization package was passed in 1996; 
this launched a gradual Europeanization of the policy area. The security of supply framework gained 
weight in the discussion of a European energy policy in the 2000s, in light of rising oil and gas prices, 
the accession of eastern European countries with a particularly high energy import dependency on 
Russia, and the Russia–Ukraine gas disputes (Helm 2012). Energy was eventually elevated into 
primary EU law in the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. 
Naturally, the three energy policy objectives can be at odds with each other. For example, national 
subsidy schemes in the form of feed-in tariffs (FiTs) (supporting electricity generated from climate-
neutral renewable energy sources) stand directly against the creation of a European internal market for 
energy (Buchan and Keay 2015). On the other hand, the different objectives can also act together on 
multiple levels. In the European Commission’s view, an integrated market increases both supply 
security and climate mitigation – the resulting efficiency gains, together with the deployment of 
renewable energy sources, lead to a decreased import dependency on fossil fuels (Fischer 2017; 
Schubert et al. 2016).  
The European Commission has continuously advocated the creation of a more comprehensive and 
European energy policy. Key documents are the communication An Energy Policy for Europe 
(European Commission 2007), the Climate and Energy Package (2008)2, the Energy Roadmap 2050 
(2011), the Energy Union Package (2015), and the Clean Energy Package (2016). The last two policy 
documents, in particular, emphasize an inclusive approach to a European energy policy which aims to 
integrate its three pillars more effectively (Vinois 2017; Buchan and Keay 2016). The policy documents 
mentioned here will be discussed in detail in the following sections.  
 
 
                                                     
 
2 Became binding EU law through the Renewable Energy Directive, European Parliament and Council of the European Union 
2009a. 
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3.1 Competition 
Competition and the internal market are the central instruments in European energy policy (Peng and 
Poudineh 2017; Crisan and Kuhn 2017). 
In general, a fully functioning market for energy would significantly contribute to the two other energy 
policy goals (climate change mitigation and security of supply). To elaborate, in such a market, 
consumers would be able to choose from a greater diversity of suppliers and undermine the power of 
natural gas importers (such as Gazprom), thus enhancing security of supply. Second, competition 
between energy producers would drive efficiency and reduce costs, and potentially also reduce both 
import dependency (of oil and natural gas) and CO2 intensity (Helm 2014). In addition, an 
interconnected market allows for the integration of large-scale renewable energy sources and a more 
effective balancing between production and consumption across Europe (ENTSO-E 2014a). 
From a policymaking perspective, competition rules are the strong suit of the European Commission – 
it possesses exhaustive competences in this area. For instance, the EC can launch infringement 
proceedings against member states in cases where EU competition law is not correctly applied; this in 
turn can eventually lead to a court filing at the CJEU.3 Moreover, the Commission can fine individual 
companies for the violation of monopoly rules.4 By applying EU competition rules, the EC has aimed to 
frame energy policy around the liberalization of the sector, which has ultimately resulted in the three 
liberalization packages (1996/98, 2003, and 2009) (Schubert et al. 2016). 
Hardware and software – the status quo 
The internal market for energy consists of a software and a hardware component. On the software side, 
moderate progress has been achieved. The unbundling of vertically integrated energy companies and 
guaranteed access to gas and electricity grids for third parties has opened the market. Consumers are 
now free to choose their electricity and gas provider, resulting in increased competition between 
suppliers. Moreover, the coupling of energy markets, the implementation of Network Codes, and 
coordination efforts by ACER facilitate the trading of energy across Europe (Crisan and Kuhn 2017). 
Nevertheless, considerable flaws in the design of the European market, particularly in electricity, still 
exist (Peng and Poudineh 2017). In other words, and partly due to the aforementioned national FiTs for 
renewables, electricity prices are distorted. For instance, retail prices for consumers vary considerably 
from country to country (Schubert et al. 2016). Moreover, the gap between wholesale and retail prices 
is widening and price signals are not passed on to consumers, thus lowering the incentive for the desired 
demand-side response measures, and undermining the EU policy goal of affordability. Negative 
wholesale prices for electricity occur frequently, signalling a dysfunctional market. In addition, the 
energy-only market does not currently provide price signals that are capable of triggering investment in 
the necessary energy infrastructure. This is true for both dispatchable (mainly fossil combustion) and 
also for the non-dispatchable (mainly solar and wind) generation plants which are essential to a 
decarbonized power system (Keay 2016). Ultimately, with 28 NRAs, electricity market regulation in 
Europe remains focused on the national level, as ACER is not a European regulator but a cooperation 
platform for national regulators. A stronger role for ACER, as proposed in the EC’s Winter Package 
(European Commission 2016a), could facilitate the transformation of the agency into a European 
regulator; this would enable it to tackle congestion issues and the underutilization of cross-border 
interconnections more effectively.  
The underlying problems are structural, in the sense that the current market design is not able to 
facilitate the desired competition and investment while at the same time guaranteeing the large-scale 
integration of renewable energy (Glachant 2016; Keay 2016). The Commission, too, has articulated its 
                                                     
 
3 In 2011, the Commission launched 38 infringement proceedings, out of which 15 were handed over to the CJEU, Talus and 
Aalto 2017. 
4 In 2009, the gas companies E.ON and GDF Suez were fined €1.1 billion for unfair competition, Schubert et al. 2016. 
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own uncertainty about future energy market designs (European Commission 2015c). For the software 
component to contribute effectively to a fully functional internal market for energy, substantial reforms 
are needed. Different pathways for reforming the software are possible; these range from a set of 
amendments as proposed by the EC in the Winter Package (see below), to a more fundamental revision 
toward a two-tier market design (Keay and Robinson 2017), a decentralized design (Kristov et al. 2016), 
or an energy-and-delivery market design (Pierpont and Nelson 2017), to name some recent 
suggestions. As the current market design is closely linked to the way in which existing infrastructure 
was planned in the past, a revised market design would also require the hardware component of the 
electricity market to be updated. 
The second and complementary component for a functioning European energy market is hardware – 
meaning energy transport infrastructure. The hardware aspect is particularly important for the trading 
of gas and electricity since both are grid-bound and need a physical interconnection between buyer and 
seller (unlike oil). With regard to electricity in Europe, cross-border interconnectors are key to building 
a true European grid and for a European market to materialize. However, the sector has developed 
over time in such a way that the EU currently has 28 national electricity grids which are divided into five 
regional groups (Schubert et al. 2016). While the cross-border exchange of electricity has been 
increasing over the last 20 years, congestion between member states still exists, impeding the free 
trade of electricity between national markets. In addition to the aforementioned software flaws, this 
congestion is mainly due to underdeveloped physical interconnection capacities which have not kept 
pace with the increasing share of intermittent renewables; for optimal grid integration of renewables 
more cross-border trading is required (see Section, 3.2).  
In order to facilitate the building of electricity interconnections, the Commission has developed a set of 
tools and measures which were translated into binding EU law via Regulation (EC) No. 347/2013 (the 
TEN-E Regulation, European Parliament and Council of the European Union 2013). The central 
instrument here is the identification and realization of Projects of Common Interest (PCIs). In electricity, 
these projects include transmission lines and storage facilities. The objective of the PCIs is to physically 
connect national electricity markets and to construct infrastructure where it will have the biggest impact 
on the achievement of EU policy goals, namely the provision of secure, affordable, and sustainable 
electricity (European Commission 2018d). The underlying idea is for the TSOs to focus on projects that 
will contribute most to  
• cross-border trading,  
• integration of renewable electricity,  
• mitigation of capacity congestions, and  
• the guaranteeing of a secure supply of electricity.  
In order to trigger the necessary investment in the PCIs, the Commission provides a set of incentives 
for TSOs and third-party project promoters. PCIs enjoy priority over other projects at the national level, 
are granted a streamlined permitting process, and receive significant EU public funding and financing 
(Buchan and Keay 2015). For instance, under the European Commission’s Connecting Europe Facility 
(CEF), 50 per cent of a PCI’s total project cost is covered by a grant (see Section 5). The PCIs have to 
be located within the 12 different priority corridors set out in the TEN-E Regulation (Crisan and Kuhn 
2017). The PCI selection process, championed by the EC, is based on ENTSO-E’s TYNDP as it uses 
the same cost–benefit analysis (CBA) and all potential PCIs must have been included in the previous 
TYNDP project list (Crisan and Kuhn 2017). Since 2014, significant responsibility for the hardware 
component of the internal market for energy (see Section 4.2) has been assigned to the TYNDP 
scenario development process, on which the selection of future infrastructure projects is based. The 
current PCI list includes 106 electricity transmission and storage projects (European Commission 
2018a). 
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Policy goals – impact on electricity 
The Union’s central policy goal in competition is the completion of the internal energy market. With 
regard to electricity, the European Commission has acknowledged that the current market design needs 
to be adapted to the more flexible nature of the electricity sector. Hence the EC proposed, in its Winter 
Package (COM(2016) 864, COM(2016) 861, COM(2016) 863), COM(2016) 862), a set of measures to 
improve, primarily, the software of the existing market structure. Among these measures are (Buchan 
and Keay 2016):  
• more effective scarcity pricing,  
• a move towards shorter-term trading in wholesale markets,  
• improved member state coordination of capacity mechanisms and RES support schemes 
(with minimized market distortion and approved by the respective NRAs), and  
• a significant amplification of ACER’s competences to enable true European market 
regulation.  
In addition, the aforementioned ROCs are envisioned to play a greater role in advancing the software 
component – for example through coordinated system operation, capacity calculation, and risk 
preparedness (European Commission 2016c). The EU inter-institutional negotiations over the proposed 
measures are ongoing (December 2018).  
In terms of goals for the development of electricity hardware, the EU has established minimum 
interconnection targets. As part of the Energy Union package, member states are supposed to install 
10 per cent cross-border capacity (as a proportion of their total generation capacity) until 2020 and then 
15 per cent until 2030 (European Commission 2015a). Moreover, the EC has proposed a threshold for 
wholesale market price differences. If the price differential between member states, regions, or bidding 
zones is above 2 €/MWh, the respective member states are encouraged to build more interconnectors 
(European Commission 2017b).  
In addition, the Commission has set up the Commission Expert Group on electricity interconnection 
targets, a rather exclusive forum consisting of 17 experts from ACER, ENTSO-E, the European Network 
of Transmission System Operators for Natural Gas (ENTSOG), TSOs, interest groups, academics, and 
technology companies. The expert group has met 14 times between October 2016 and October 2018 
in order to ‘guide the development of trans-European electricity infrastructure’ (Commission Expert 
Group on electricity interconnection targets 2017). 
By 2017, 11 member states had yet to reach the 10 per cent cross-border capacity threshold, but of 
these, seven were on a trajectory to achieve it by 2020 (European Commission 2017b). The 
interconnection targets will primarily be achieved with PCIs.  
To sum up, the competition pillar of European energy policy has two implications for electricity policy:  
1. The need for an inclusive progression of the software component, in order to create a 
European market. This entails either a reform or a complete overhaul of the existing market 
design, accompanied by the further development of network codes and national electricity 
market coupling.  
2. The construction of physical cross-border interconnections. This is quantified through the 
targets for national electricity grids of 10 per cent and 15 per cent by 2020 and 2030, 
respectively.  
3.2 Mitigation of climate change 
With the entering of climate change onto the political agenda, sustainability became a driver of 
European energy policy in the 1990s (Biesenbender 2015). The European Commission introduced, in 
1997, the objective of increasing the share of electricity produced from renewable sources in order to 
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lower emissions, reduce import dependency, and create economic growth (European Commission 
1997). At the same time, the EU would be at the forefront of mitigating climate change. In the Renewable 
Energy Directive in 2009, the member states agreed to binding targets for 2020 (European Parliament 
and Council of the European Union 2009a):  
• a 20 per cent reduction of greenhouse gas emission (compared to 1990),  
• a 20 per cent share of renewables in energy consumption,  
• reduction of total energy consumption by 20 per cent through efficiency gains.  
The Directive evolved into an important pillar of European energy policy and became the central 
instrument for the reduction of carbon emissions (Schubert et al. 2016; Buchan and Keay 2015). This 
is partly due to the fact that the EU Emission Trading System (EUETS) has not yet proved to be an 
effective mechanism and rather negates renewables deployment (Helm 2014). The Renewable Energy 
Directive was supplemented by the 2030 Energy Strategy in 2014 (European Council 2014); this defines 
a goal of a Europe-wide 27 per cent share of renewable energy of final consumption and a 40 per cent 
reduction of overall CO2 emissions.  
Policy goals – impact on electricity 
The reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and the goals for renewables share have a particularly 
strong impact on the European power sector, and are therefore key elements of EU electricity 
policymaking. The 2009 Directive set individual national targets and thus spurred the development of 
different renewables support schemes in the member states (Schubert et al. 2016; Helm 2014). 
However, this situation is in direct conflict with the principle of competition and the goal of creating an 
internal market for electricity. 
In addition, the increasing share of renewables production has impacts on both the software and the 
hardware components of the European electricity system. With regard to software, non-dispatchable 
renewables with very low marginal costs, supported by subsidies, disrupt the traditional market – which 
was designed for electricity produced by large, centralized fossil fuel power plants (Peng and Poudineh 
2017). This results in incorrect price signals for investment, a large gap between wholesale and retail 
prices, and the introduction of market-distorting instruments such as capacity mechanisms at the 
national level. 
On the other hand, the increasing share of electricity from renewables is having a stark impact on the 
infrastructure of the European electricity system. Since electricity produced from wind and solar, the 
two largest sources of renewable energy in Europe, is intermittent and often supported by national 
FiTs,5 daily and seasonal fluctuations of supply occur. In an electricity grid, these fluctuations need to 
be balanced and matched with equal demand. This can principally be achieved in three ways:  
• by promoting demand flexibility to match the fluctuating supply,  
• by the deployment of large-scale electricity storage, or  
• via the integration of various supply and demand centres.  
For technological and economic reasons, the first two measures are not yet a viable European solution, 
particularly for seasonal fluctuations. Hence, the EU pursues the strategy of improved integration: in 
order to accommodate intermittent electricity and to match demand and supply on a European scale, 
extensive cross-border interconnection infrastructure and a ‘smarter grid’ is pursued (European 
Commission 2011, 2015a; Crisan and Kuhn 2017). This is also necessary because the centres of 
generation and demand are geographically distant, as the majority of European renewable electricity is 
                                                     
 
5 FiTs enable producers of renewable electricity to sell their electricity below market price; this effectively guarantees feed in.  
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currently produced at the periphery (for example around the North Sea area) and needs to be 
transported to centres of demand, for example in south Germany and north Italy.  
To sum up, the sustainability pillar of European energy policy requires the current market design to be 
reformed (software) and the electricity infrastructure (hardware) to be expanded and better integrated. 
In fact, with an anticipated minimum share of 45 per cent renewables in the electricity sector by 2030 
(European Commission 2014), considerable investment in transmission and interconnection 
infrastructure is needed – as outlined in each scenario in the EC’s Energy Roadmap 2050 (European 
Commission 2011).   
3.3 Security of supply 
In the light of the accession of Eastern European member states in 2004 and 2007, and particularly 
considering the Ukraine–Russia gas crisis in 2009, security of energy supply came to the focus of 
European policymakers (Buchan 2015). Since then, security of supply has become the central theme, 
and arguably the ultimate goal, of European energy policy (Schubert et al. 2016). This development is 
reflected in the Commission’s Energy Union (European Commission 2015b) strategy, in which a secure 
energy supply plays a pivotal role and is closely linked to foreign policy issues (Fischer 2017; Franza 
and van der Linde 2017). This rise of supply security on the EU’s energy policy agenda is associated 
primarily with natural gas imports and has resulted, for example, in the creation of the Gas Coordination 
Group in 2011.  
The EU’s striving for sustainability has also had an increasing impact on the security of supply 
component. This impact is twofold:  
• The accomplishment of the Union’s efficiency and renewable energy goals would decrease 
its import dependency on fossil fuels and therefore increase supply security (Fischer 2017).  
• The increasing share of intermittent electricity from renewables can have negative effects 
on system stability and adequacy. Therefore, security of electricity supply has received 
particular attention at both the national level and in recent EU policy documents (for 
example in the Clean Energy Package (European Commission 2016a) and the 
Communication on strengthening Europe’s energy networks (European Commission 
2017b)).  
Policy goals – impact on electricity 
The volatile, less predictable, and decentralized character of renewable electricity generation strains 
the existing grid infrastructure that was designed for a system based on dispatchable, centralized 
generation. As a result, European grids are running closer to their operational limits and, due to their 
interconnectivity, a potential disruption could have severe Europe-wide consequences6 (ENTSO-E 
2018c).  
As large-scale electricity storage and demand response are not yet available, member states have 
introduced capacity mechanisms at the national level in order to counter the intermittency of renewable 
electricity and to guarantee security of supply. While these mechanisms enable the balancing of 
generation fluctuations in the grid through dispatchable (primarily gas) power plants, their payment 
schemes distort the internal market for electricity. The European Commission aims to coordinate these 
different schemes and to smooth out national differences (Glachant 2016).  
At the European level, ENTSO-E ensures the security of electricity supply by facilitating the 
harmonization of planning and operating guidelines and is, in particular, promoting adherence to the n-
1 criterion.7 Another measure for increasing the security of electricity supply at the European level is 
                                                     
 
6 As was the case during the European blackout in November 2006, UCTE 2007. 
7 This guarantees system stability when one transmission line or major generating unit goes offline.  
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the expansion of cross-border interconnections – a strategy actively pursued by the European 
Commission (see for example European Commission 2017b). In particular, the interconnection targets 
of 10 per cent and 15 per cent, primarily through the construction of the aforementioned PCIs, are 
intended to contribute to electricity supply security. In addition, the EC has proposed two thresholds in 
order to spur the construction of interconnections: member states with a nominal transmission capacity 
below 30 per cent of their peak load and/or below 30 per cent of their installed renewable generation 
capacity ‘should urgently investigate options of further interconnectors’ (European Commission 2017b, 
p. 12).  
To sum up with regard to electricity policy, the security of supply pillar of European energy policy results 
in increased harmonization efforts and the promotion of more cross-border interconnections.  
3.4 Summary of EU policies 
This review of the three pillars of EU energy policy and the associated goals for a European electricity 
policy shows that a more comprehensive physical integration of national electricity grids is needed. In 
fact, it is a key component for the achievement of each of the three policy goals – a competitive market, 
the mitigation of climate change, and a secure supply. Hence, the construction and improvement of 
cross-border interconnections is the common denominator and core element of a European electricity 
policy. Ultimately, this highlights the significance of the PCI process in EU electricity policymaking. The 
PCIs aim to trigger investments in those infrastructure projects that would contribute most to the three 
policy goals. Consequently, the European Commission attributes to the PCI selection process a 
substantial importance for the European electricity system.  
ENTSO-E’s Ten-Year Network Development Plan is the central tool for analysing the future 
requirements of the European electricity system and for identifying the PCIs.    
   
4. Correlation of TYNDP scenarios and EU policies 
This section analyses the different TYNDPs and how they relate to the European goals in energy and 
electricity policy described above.  
4.1 Introduction to TYNDPs 
The development of a two-yearly community-wide network development plan was laid out as one of the 
tasks of ENTSO-E in its founding document. This task consists of:  
‘modelling of the integrated network, scenario development, a European 
generation adequacy outlook and an assessment of the resilience of the 
system’ (European Parliament and Council of the European Union 2009b, Art. 
8.10).  
The TYNDP aims to identify challenges for the future development of the European grid, points out 
investment needs, and enables the assessment of projects with European significance on the basis of 
a common cost–benefit analysis (CBA) methodology. The future of the electricity system in Europe 
entails numerous uncertainties such as: future amount, location and modes of generation, development 
of consumption, economic framework conditions, and CO2 price. As electricity infrastructure is capital 
intensive and has long planning, permitting, construction, and operational horizons, these uncertainties 
can effectively stall the necessary investment decisions. Therefore, the TYNDP uses a set of scenarios 
in order to address these uncertainties and to provide decision makers with an overview of plausible 
futures (ENTSO-E 2010).  
While the methodology has evolved over the years, the underlying purpose of the TYNDP scenarios 
has remained largely the same. Rather than attempting to predict the future, the scenarios aim to 
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describe a realistic range of possible futures within which the actual future pathway will fall, by using 
different combinations of assumptions. Based on this range of possible futures, decision makers can 
then determine infrastructure needs and identify key cross-border projects. In addition, existing or 
planned projects can be assessed against the range of possible futures (see for example ENTSOG and 
ENTSO-E 2018; ENTSO-E 2015; 2014a). 
In general, the TYNDP scenarios combine a top-down with a bottom-up approach. To elaborate, a top-
down approach to scenario building sets a target (such as a policy goal) or a high-level expectation 
around which the scenarios are then built. A bottom-up approach, in contrast, is based on current trends 
and typically relies on best future estimations by stakeholders (ENTSO-E 2010). The TYNDP scenarios, 
specifically, take into account binding policy targets, technology roadmaps, and trends, as well as 
electricity infrastructure projects that are in the construction or planning stage. The TSOs provide the 
technical expertise and data for the development of scenarios. TSO experts are also in charge of 
determining the specific grid development needs for each scenario and are the key actors in the 
process. In addition, public workshops and consultations are carried out throughout the TYNDP and 
scenario development process, in order to receive input and feedback from stakeholders (ENTSO-E 
2015). Once finalized, the TYNDP is submitted to ACER which gives a (non-binding) opinion and 
recommendation to the Commission for approval (European Parliament and Council of the European 
Union 2009b). Based on their technical expertise, ENTSO-E and its members are in charge of 
developing the TYNDP. Nevertheless, there are also informal engagements of other stakeholders – 
such as interest groups and the European Commission (see Section 5). The EU member states 
generally engage rather indirectly through TSOs8 and the NRAs represented in ACER. 
Once the TEN-E Regulation (No. 347/2013, European Parliament and Council of the European Union 
2013) became binding, the TYNDP constituted the basis for the PCI selection process, as any potential 
transmission or storage PCI had to have been included in the project list of the previous TYNDP. In 
addition, the PCI process applies the same CBA methodology as is used in the TYNDP. 
Notwithstanding its non-binding legal status, this makes the TYNDP and its scenarios a central piece 
of European electricity policy, as the PCIs are the common denominator for the advancement of all 
three high-level policy goals (see Section 5). 
To sum up, the TYNDP is the central planning instrument for advancing the European electricity 
infrastructure (Interview 19). The core objectives are to identify future challenges to the European 
electricity system and to determine associated investment needs. These are vital components for the 
development of a European electricity system. Although the planning of pan-European infrastructure is 
a technical process driven by ENTSO-E and the national TSOs, the TYNDP is also a political process. 
This is due to both the importance of electricity infrastructure for each of the three European policy 
goals outlined above and the significance of TYNDP’s strong link to the PCI selection process. This 
political component is reflected in the scenarios developed in the TYNDP.  
4.2 TYNDP scenarios and EU policy goals 
This section investigates the scenarios developed in the 2012, 2014, 2016, and 2018 TYNDPs and 
relates them to the European policy goals. The pilot TYNDP 2010 is not considered as it was more a 
display of existing trends and not at that point a particular planning exercise (ENTSO-E 2010).  
TYNDP 2012 
The second TYNDP, in 2012, outlined a set of four visions for 2030 (shown in Figure 4.1). The objective 
of these visions was to address uncertainties in the development of the electricity system and display 
                                                     
 
8 The link with a member state government depends on the governance structure of the respective TSO. While some TSOs are 
publicly listed companies (for example National Grid in the UK), others are effectively state owned (for example PSE in Poland). 
A state-owned TSO is more closely aligned to the policies of the national government (Interview 4). 
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possible energy projections for decision makers. It is assumed that actual future developments will fall 
within the range of these visions.   
The 2030 visions are constructed along two axes: the pace of achievement of the Energy Roadmap 
2050 targets and the degree of integration of the internal energy market (ranging from a strong 
European framework and a well-integrated electricity market on the one hand, to a loose European 
framework with parallel national policies and less-integrated markets on the other). The four visions are 
Slow Progress, Money Rules, Green Transition, and Green Revolution.  
Figure 4.1: TYNDP 2012 Visions for 2030 
 
Source: ENTSO-E (2012a, p. 37) 
 
Each of the visions takes into account a set of factors that could impact member state energy policies, 
electricity demand, and generation and grid development. These factors are, for example, economic 
development, deployment of electric vehicles, demand response mechanisms, CO2 price, and the 
development of carbon-capture-and-storage (CCS) technology. In particular, the grid development 
needs of each vision are articulated by the TSOs at the European and regional level. Ultimately, in all 
visions, the Renewable Energy Directive targets for 2020 are met (with possible delays) (ENTSO-E 
2012a).  
In the light of the four visions for 2030, the TYNDP developed two scenarios for 2020. This shorter time 
horizon reduces uncertainty while simultaneously complying with the trends up to 2030. The two 
scenarios outline different paths up to 2020: 
• EU 2020 is a top-down scenario that takes the Renewable Energy Directive targets for 2020 
(20 per cent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, 20 per cent share of renewables, 20 
per cent reduction in energy consumption), together with the corresponding national energy 
action plans, as a starting point and describes a pathway to achieve these targets. The EU 
2020 is the reference scenario of the TYNDP 2012.  
• Scenario B follows a bottom-up approach and, starting from the status quo (2012), is based 
on the best estimates by TSOs. It takes into account the commissioning of future power 
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plants, while figures for generation and load are based on national information available to 
TSOs (ENTSO-E 2012a, 2012b).  
The development of the scenarios has been coordinated by ENTSO-E and was conducted by TSO 
experts in three working groups and six regional groups. Subsequently, the scenarios have been 
publicly consulted with stakeholders.  
The two developed scenarios have had a strong and distinct impact on future grid development. For 
instance, they assume different shares of renewable electricity, fossil fuels, and nuclear power. 
Moreover, EU 2020 and Scenario B differ in their assumptions about generation portfolio, demand, and 
load, with varying implications for grid development needs (ENTSO-E 2012a).  
Nevertheless, both scenarios ‘eventually rather converge, showing shared consensus regarding 
achievement of the 20:20:20 objectives’ (ENTSO-E 2012b, p. 33). Hence, the two scenarios effectively 
describe two rather similar pathways towards achieving the EU policy objectives, in this case the 
Renewable Energy Directive targets. While this was outlined in the TYNDP 2012 objectives (ENTSO-
E 2012b, p. 9), the fact that the two scenarios are alike poses a potential problem for two reasons:  
1. From a scenario development technique perspective, a narrow range of scenarios would 
conceivably fail to address all possible futures and contingencies (van der Heijden 2005).  
2. With regard to the TYNDP, the resilience of the existing and planned grid infrastructure is 
assessed exclusively against these two scenarios and their particular planning cases 
(specific contingencies such as season, demand, and weather).  
In turn, the need for, and specifics of, future projects are solely based on the two scenarios. 
Subsequently, the assessment of these projects in terms of their contribution to security of supply, social 
welfare, and renewables integration, among other factors, is only valid in these two possible futures. 
The alignment of the two TYNDP scenarios with the 20:20:20 goals could limit the resilience of the 
projects included, and in fact sets too narrow a corridor for possible future pathways; it thus confines 
the future design of the European and national electricity grids from both a technical and political 
perspective. 
To sum up, in terms of grid development, the TYNDP 2012 projects an increase in generating capacity 
that is largely based on the development of renewables. This, in turn, leads to a fundamental relocation 
of generation, resulting in larger and more intermittent power flows across Europe. Consequently, 
bottlenecks and investment needs in the grid infrastructure are identified, resulting in more than 100 
pan-European transmission projects worth €104 billion of investments. These investments contribute to 
all three EU electricity policy goals: European market integration (47 per cent of projects), integration 
of renewable energy sources (80 per cent of projects) and CO2 emission reduction (100 per cent), and 
higher security of the grid (100 per cent) (ENTSO-E 2012b, pp. 16–17). 
TYNDP 2014 
The subsequent TYNDP differs significantly from TYNDP 2012 in two respects: its scenario 
development methodology and its institutional significance within the EU’s energy policy.  
The TYNDP extended its time horizon to 2030 and scenarios for 2020 are no longer developed. The 
four visions for 2030 outlined in the previous TYNDP (Figure 4.1) are elevated into the central scenarios 
for determining different future paths (see Figure 4.2). This change was largely based on feedback from 
stakeholders, who requested longer-term and more contrasting scenarios (ENTSO-E 2014a). Hence 
the TYNDP puts a greater emphasis on stakeholder participation throughout the process and pursues 
a more holistic scenario development approach. The visions are again designed along the same axes: 
pace of achievement of the Energy Roadmap 2050 and degree of integration of the European electricity 
market. However, in contrast to the four visions described in the previous TYNDP, the 2014 edition 
sketches out the extremes on the two axes, resulting in four contrasting scenarios: Slow Progress, 
Money Rules, Green Transition, and Green Revolution (Figure 4.2). These are then fleshed out with 
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political and economic frameworks, while the respective generation and load characteristics are based 
on a set of different parameters (such as CO2 price, deployment of electric vehicles, fuel prices, CCS 
deployment, and smart grids). The four scenarios differ in terms of future electricity consumption, 
generation mix, CO2 emissions, electricity prices and, most significantly, renewables deployment. 
Nevertheless, across all scenarios, CO2 emissions are predicted to fall and the share of renewables to 
rise.  
Figure 4.2: TYNDP 2014 Visions for 2030 
 
Source: ENTSO-E (2014a, p. 9) 
The TYNDP 2014 again uses a combination of top-down (Money Rules, Green Revolution) and bottom-
up (Slow Progress, Green Transition) scenarios. The primary difference between the two approaches 
is the strong integration of electricity grids at the European level in the top-down scenarios, versus 
resolute parallel national policies in the bottom-up scenarios (ENTSO-E 2014b). In comparison to the 
two scenarios developed in the TYNDP 2012, the 2014 scenarios are evidently more diverse and 
nuanced, and cover a wider range of possible futures and contingencies. In addition, the evaluation of 
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infrastructure projects within these scenarios is arguably more sophisticated as, for the first time, the 
TYNDP applies a common and quantitative cost–benefit analysis (CBA). 
With regard to the EU energy policy goals, all four 2014 scenarios are eventually on track for achieving 
the Roadmap 2050 objectives, the difference being the slower pace in Slow Progress and Money Rules 
up to 2030. The projects included in the TYNDP 2014 are evaluated against their respective contribution 
to the EU energy policy goals in the different scenarios. In particular, projects are evaluated against 
their contribution to the EU energy policy goals in Vision 1 (Slow Progress) and 4 (Green Revolution): 
in Vision 1, 44 per cent and in Vision 4, 80 per cent of projects contribute to the integration of renewables 
electricity into the European grid. On the other hand, 50 per cent of projects in Vision 1 and 92 per cent 
of projects in Vision 4 assist the mitigation of CO2 emissions.9 
With the 2014 edition, the institutional significance of the TYNDP grew after the aforementioned EU 
Regulation 347/2013 on Trans-European Networks in Energy (TEN-E) was passed in 2013. This 
Regulation strongly promotes the development of cross-border transmission infrastructure in Europe 
through the process of defining PCIs. Moreover, it calls for the development, and sets the requirements, 
of a standard CBA methodology. The Commission plays an active role in the development of the CBA 
methodology and gives the final approval (Interview 20). Ultimately, the TEN-E regulation positions the 
TYNDP as the sole platform for identifying potential PCIs, since all future PCIs have to be part of the 
TYNDP’s project list (ENTSO-E 2014a).  
Nevertheless, the TEN-E Regulation effectively creates a new structure for advancing the hardware 
component of the European electricity system that is outside the ENTSO-E framework (Glachant 2017). 
To elaborate, the PCI process is the selection, evaluation, and possible financing of priority grid 
investment projects outside the ENTSO-E framework. The PCIs are selected and evaluated in four 
regional groups that are defined in the Regulation.10 These groups consist of representatives from: the 
respective regional TSOs and NRAs, ACER, member states, and project promoters and each is led by 
an EC official. Potential projects are evaluated using the CBA methodology and, after the final PCI list 
is adopted by the EC, confirmed projects receive EU funding. In addition, the PCI selection process has 
priority over the instruments of the ENTSO-E framework (Glachant 2017).   
The TEN-E regulation significantly changes the institutional role of the TYNDP in European electricity 
policy. The TYNDP now constitutes the first stage of defining the need for future key grid development 
projects in Europe. Hence, participants in the TYNDP development process take into consideration the 
immediate connection with the PCI process, together with its significance for their respective interests 
(see Section 5).  
To sum up, the TYNDP 2014 presents a significant upgrade from the 2012 edition in terms of both its 
scenario development methodology and its institutional significance. The developed scenarios are more 
detailed and diverse than those in the previous TYNDPs and cover a wider range of possible futures. 
All four scenarios developed in the TYNDP 2014 describe a decline in CO2 emissions, a rising share of 
electricity generated from renewable sources and, ultimately, achievement of the Roadmap 2050 goals. 
The report explicitly describes the share of projects that contribute to renewables integration and the 
mitigation of CO2 emissions at the European level. In addition, the TYNDP identifies around 100 projects 
of pan-European significance with a total investment need of €150 billion up to 2030 (ENTSO-E 2014a).  
                                                     
 
9 The benefits for security of supply are described as being too high-level to be measured by the TYNDP project assessment 
methodology. 
10 North Seas offshore grid (NSOG); north–south electricity interconnections in western Europe (NSI West Electricity); north–
south electricity interconnections in central, eastern, and south-eastern Europe (NSI East Electricity); Baltic Energy Market 
Interconnection Plan in electricity (BEMIP Electricity). 
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Ultimately, the TEN-E regulation ascribes to the TYNDP 2014 a more important role in the overall 
institutional setting of EU energy policy, as it is established as the exclusive basis for the identification 
of Projects of Common Interest.  
TYNDP 2016 
The 2016 edition of the TYNDP (see Figure 4.3) largely maintains and builds upon the scenario 
development storylines of the previous plan by developing four scenarios along the same two axes 
(pace of achievement of the Energy Roadmap 2050 targets and the degree of integration of the 
European electricity market). The scenarios are dubbed Slowest Progress, Constrained Progress, 
National Green Transition, and European Green Transition. The first and third scenarios are once again 
based on a bottom-up and the second and fourth on a top-down methodology. While they are generally 
consistent with the four scenarios developed in the TYNDP 2014, the 2016 scenarios are ‘refocused on 
the EU 2030 goals’ (ENTSO-E 2016, p. 42).  
Figure 4.3: TYNDP 2016 Visions for 2030 
 
Source: ENTSO-E (2015, p. 10) 
In addition, the TYNDP 2016 develops a fifth scenario for 2020. Based on stakeholder requests, the 
short-term scenario Expected Progress constitutes a forecast, and is understood as being the last point 
in the future before uncertainties in the development of the energy system increase (see Figure 4.4). It 
takes into consideration transmission and generation projects that have been determined by the time 
the TYNDP 2016 was published (ENTSO-E 2015). 
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Figure 4.4: TYNDP 2016 scenario framework 
 
Source: ENTSO-E (2015, p. 9) 
The four scenarios for 2030 all have in common a (varyingly) increasing share of electricity from 
renewable sources (45 per cent to 60 per cent of demand) and a decreasing CO2 intensity in the power 
sector (–50 per cent to –80 per cent emissions reduction). In fact, all scenarios are aligned with the EU 
energy policy goals defined in the 2030 Energy Strategy, namely a 27 per cent share of renewable 
energy in European final consumption (this translates approximately to a 40 per cent share in power 
generation) and a 40 per cent reduction in overall CO2 emissions (European Council 2014; European 
Commission 2015b).11 Consequently, in comparison to the 2014 edition, the 2016 TYNDP’s ‘span of 
the four Visions is of course reduced, adapted to the Energy Union goals by a closer horizon’ (ENTSO-
E 2016, p. 5). For instance, along the axis for ‘pace of achievement of the Energy Roadmap 2050 
targets’, two scenarios are on track for achieving the Roadmap’s goals, while the remaining two 
scenarios are aligned with the 2030 goals for renewables set in the 2030 Energy Strategy and the 
Energy Union Package (ENTSO-E 2015). Moreover, the projects included in the TYNDP 2016 
guarantee the accomplishment of the 10 per cent interconnection capacity target for each member state 
by 2020, except for Spain (ENTSO-E 2016).  
To sum up, the TYNDP 2016 largely retains the scenario design and methodology of the previous 
TYNDP and focuses more on stakeholder participation and feedback. However, the TYNDP 2016 
scenarios are clearly aligned with, and focus on, the achievement of the EU energy policy goals for 
2030 agreed on by the Council in October 2014. In turn, this results in the more narrow scope seen in 
the developed scenarios. With regard to infrastructure needs, the TYNDP 2016 ascribes €150 billion of 
investment in pan-European transmission projects, the majority linked to the integration of intermittent 
electricity from renewable sources (ENTSO-E 2016).  
                                                     
 
11 On 14 June 2018, the EC, the European Parliament, and the Council reached an agreement on a binding renewable energy 
target for the EU for 2030 of 32%, European Commission 2018c. 
 19 
 
 
TYNDP 2018 
The TYNDP 2018 is arguably the most comprehensive, complex, and detailed European network 
development plan developed. In general terms, the market modelling and climate database 
methodology for forecasting weather conditions have been improved and stakeholder engagement 
processes have evolved. ENTSO-E continues to emphasize the importance of participation and 
feedback. Moreover, the CBA methodology for assessing TYNDP projects has been advanced (now 
called CBA 2.0) and features the assessment of security of supply impact and storage projects (ENTSO-
E 2018b).  
Nevertheless, two fundamental changes to the TYNDP 2018 stand out:  
1. This edition of the network development plan has, for the first time, been conducted in 
cooperation between ENTSO-E and ENTSOG as a joint undertaking.  
2. The scenario design was overhauled; it now covers future developments until 2040 and 
features eight scenarios for four different time horizons. Notably, the European 
Commission’s EU Reference Scenario 2016 (EUCO Scenario) has been included as an 
external scenario for 2030.  
The underlying rationale for the ENTSOs’ joint development of the TYNDP 2018 is to take better 
advantage of the commonalities and overlaps of the future developments of the gas and electricity 
sectors and to acknowledge the input of a wider range of stakeholders. Both organizations pooled their 
technical expertise and scenario development experience in order to develop more comprehensive and 
robust scenarios for the European energy sector (ENTSOG and ENTSO-E 2018). However, the joint 
design of the process also resulted in a more complicated and lengthy development process for 
participants (Interview 8). 
The second significant revision to the previous TYNDPs is a fundamental change in the TYNDP 
scenario design. The plan now describes two Best Estimate scenarios for the short (2020) and medium 
term (2025) respectively. These two scenarios follow a bottom-up logic and are based on the TSOs’ 
estimates, and consider current national and European regulations. Their purpose is to map the 
development of the European energy system up to the point where uncertainties over possible future 
pathways become too great after 2025. For the year 2030, the TYNDP 2018 takes into consideration 
three scenarios and, for the first time, breaks with the outline of the scenario parameters (using two 
axes) as described in the previous TYNDPs. Instead, ENTSO-E developed two scenarios, Sustainable 
Transition and Distributed Generation that differ from one another with regard to a number of criteria 
such as: general economic conditions, growth of electric vehicle use, wind and solar generation 
capacity, and demand flexibility, among others. In addition, the EC’s EUCO Scenario was included as 
a third pathway towards 2030 (See Figure 4.5). 
The EUCO Scenario is based on the Commission’s EU Reference Scenario 2016, published by the 
DGs for Energy, Climate Action, and Mobility and Transport in 2016.12 The aim of the Reference 
Scenario was to take into consideration current policies and market trends, and to project their impact 
on the development of the European energy system up to 2050. The scenario assumes the 
achievement of both the 2020 and 2030 EU energy policy goals (European Commission 2016b). Within 
the TYNDP 2018, the EUCO Scenario replaces the ENTSO-E internal Global Climate Action Scenario 
and covers the time horizon up to 2030. The incorporation of the EC’s scenario into the TYNDP 2018 
was initiated by the Commission (Interview 20) and evoked mixed reactions among stakeholders in the 
TYNDP process (Interviews 6, 12, 17, 18). In fact, ENTSO-E and ENTSOG also acknowledge that the 
different methodologies used in the externally and the internally developed scenarios negatively impact 
their compatibility (ENTSOG and ENTSO-E 2018, p. 9).  
                                                     
 
12 The EU Reference Scenario 2016 was amended for the TYNDP but the EUCO Scenario uses the same data. 
 20 
 
 
As for the scenarios covering 2040, the TYNDP 2018 continues the storylines of the two internally 
developed scenarios: Sustainable Transition and Distributed Generation and adds Global Climate 
Action (derived also from the Sustainable Transition 2030 storyline). The three scenarios are 
characterized by differences in a set of categories; however, they all show a pathway towards achieving 
EU targets for 2030 and 205013 (ENTSO-E 2018d).  
Figure 4.5: Overview of the TYNDP 2018 scenarios 
 
Source: ENTSOG and ENTSO-E (2018, p. 8) 
In addition, the TYNDP 2018 directly refers to the proposals of the aforementioned Commission Expert 
Group on electricity interconnection targets. The plan assesses the criteria for greater interconnection 
investment (price differential between member states, regions, or bidding zones; transmission capacity 
in relation to peak load; transmission capacity in relation to installed renewable generation capacity) in 
the three 2030 scenarios, taking into account projects included in the TYNDP. As a result, it is 
determined by ENTSO-E that significant price differences still exist in all scenarios, signalling the need 
for additional interconnection capacity investments in addition to the project list included in the TYNDP 
2018. Ultimately, in order to illustrate the need for grid investments, the 2018 edition of the TYNDP 
outlines the theoretical costs of non-investment in the European electricity grid infrastructure for 2030 
and 2040, together with the negative impacts on security of supply, electricity prices, and the integration 
of electricity from renewable sources (ENTSO-E 2018d). 
To sum up, the TYNDP 2018 features a substantially increased complexity with regard to both its 
development process and the scenarios. On the one hand, this is due to the cooperation with ENTSOG 
and the subsequent increase of involved stakeholders. On the other hand, the new scenario design and 
the multiple time horizons contribute to a more convoluted set of scenarios and possible future 
pathways. Nevertheless, all TYNDP 2018 scenarios are broadly in line with existing EU energy policy 
and with achieving the 2030 and 2050 targets. This is particularly visible due to the integration of the 
external EUCO Scenario, which is in fact an EU policy scenario.  
 
                                                     
 
13 The scenario Sustainable Transition in 2040 lags slightly on its path towards achieving the 2050 goals. 
 21 
 
 
Summary TYNDP and EU policy goals 
This section has explored the relationship between the TYNDPs and European energy policy. The 
document analysis has unearthed a policy congruence between the investigated TYNDPs and existing 
EU energy policy. To elaborate, this relationship manifests itself on two levels. First, the scenarios 
developed in the various TYNDPs widely assume the achievement of EU policy targets for 2020, 2030, 
and 2050. Moreover, they describe general future trends that are in line with European energy policies 
– such as an increasing share of renewables, reduction of CO2 emissions, and increased 
interconnection (resulting in extensive investments in cross-border transmission projects). 14  This 
congruence is particularly visible where the TYNDP scenarios changed along the lines of new energy 
policies coming into place, for instance the TYNDP 2016 scenarios that refocused on the 2030 targets 
(ENTSO-E 2016). Therefore, the spectrum of possible future pathways is narrowed down. The second 
level of congruence relates to the evaluation of projects included in the TYNDPs. In addition to technical 
and economic aspects, the benefits of transmission and storage projects are assessed against their 
impact on EU policy goals, namely the integration of intermittent renewable electricity, the reduction of 
CO2 emissions, the completion of the internal market, and the contribution to security of supply.  
As a result, all projects included in the TYNDP, and successfully assessed by the CBA methodology, 
are effectively contributing to the achievement of EU energy policy goals. This is further emphasized by 
the TYNDP’s strong link to the PCI process, which is the Commission’s central policy tool for triggering 
investment in key infrastructure that contributes to the energy policy goals. 
The described policy congruence is indeed recognized by the different stakeholders involved in the 
TYNDP process. The development of scenarios is understood as a partially political process (Interview 
10) in which political expectations, primarily articulated by the European Commission, have a 
substantial impact on the scenario outcome (Interviews 5, 7, 11). Effectively, the scenarios developed 
in the TYNDP are policy scenarios (Interview 17) which consider existing policy goals as a starting point 
(Interview 18) and are therefore politically constrained (Interviews 2, 12).  
The following section investigates how the TYNDP’s policy congruence is connected to its utilization by 
different stakeholders.  
 
5. Utilization of the TYNDP in the wider policymaking arena 
The TYNDP and its scenarios are utilized in the wider European energy policy in two ways. First, there 
is an interdependence between the national network development plans and the TYNDP. In particular, 
the national plans feed into the pan-European TYNDP. At the same time, TSOs and member states 
draw from the TYNDPs and its scenarios to further develop and adjust their national network 
development plans. In specific terms, most TSOs base their future cross-border projects primarily on 
the bottom-up scenarios of the TYNDP, which provides a wider European picture and indicates future 
developments in the neighbouring states and beyond (Interviews 1, 3, 4, 8, 17). In fact, this aspect is 
also important for member states’ national energy policies in terms of the integration of electricity from 
intermittent renewable sources and national system stability. Nevertheless, inconsistencies between 
the TYNDP and the national plans also exist; for instance the pursuit of national energy self-sufficiency 
in some member states versus the primacy of interconnectivity in the TYNDP (Interview 5). Ultimately, 
the TYNDP can be used by TSOs as a testing ground for projects that are not included in their binding 
national plan and which do not have the support of their respective NRA. In the case that one of these 
                                                     
 
14 For example, substantially increased levels of European interconnectivity are foreseen in each policy scenario developed in 
the Commission’s Energy Roadmap 2050, European Commission 2011. 
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projects receives the PCI label, this could constitute a back door for TSOs to include a project in a 
national development plan (Interview 17).   
The second and more significant utilization of the TYNDP and its scenarios in EU energy policy is 
connected to its relevance for the PCI selection process. As discussed above, the TYNDP presents the 
basis for identifying key European infrastructure projects, since future PCIs need to be part of the 
previous TYNDP’s project list (Crisan and Kuhn 2017). Since all the projects included in the TYNDP 
effectively contribute to EU energy policy goals, the selection of PCIs is a logical and streamlined next 
step. Considering the TYNDP projects, those contributing the most to the European energy goals 
receive PCI status. PCI candidate projects are assessed using the same CBA as is applied in the 
TYNDP development process. As a consequence, all parts of the TYNDP development process are 
relevant for the PCI selection (see Figure 5.1).  
Figure 5.1: Interrelation TYNDP process and PCI projects 
 
Source: ENTSO-E (2018d, p. 7) 
The strong relevance for the PCI process determines how the TYNDP scenarios are utilized by key 
stakeholders and how and why these actors engage in the process.  
As the central promoter of a European electricity system and the initiator and steward of the PCI 
process, the European Commission has a strong interest in the development of the TYNDP. The EC 
does not play a formal role in the TYNDP process. However, it has established the informal PCI 
Cooperation Platform which brings together representatives from the ENTSO-E secretariat, ACER, and 
the Commission and it meets every four to six weeks. Through this platform, the Commission aims to 
receive first-hand information on TYNDP projects, voices its expectations with regard to the subsequent 
PCI process, and tries to guarantee the quality of the CBA. Ultimately, the EC attempts to influence the 
content and quality of the TYNDP and exercises a certain impact in this regard (Interviews 17, 19, 20). 
As described in Section 3.1, the PCIs are the central instrument used to advance the hardware 
component of the European electricity market (Crisan and Kuhn 2017). Moreover, the purpose of PCIs 
is also to directly contribute to the grid integration of intermittent electricity from renewable sources and 
to security of supply (European Commission 2018d). In other words, the PCI process links the TYNDP 
and its scenarios directly to the EU’s energy policy goals. Therefore, it is crucial for the Commission to 
be informed about and to engage in the TYNDP development, in order to realize its energy policy goals. 
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In fact, one TSO representative comprehends the TYNDP as an instrument to achieve the EU’s 
renewable energy goals (Interview 6). 
For TSOs as well, the link between the TYNDP and the PCI selection process is critical. While the 
TYNDP is a non-binding document, PCIs are key European projects which have to be included in 
binding national network development plans. In addition, PCI projects can receive significant EU 
financial support. The Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) holds a total of €5.35 billion for PCIs in the 
energy arena (European Commission 2018d). Typically, the CEF, via a grant, contributes 50 per cent 
to a PCI’s total project costs. The largest such grant to date was the €578 million EU contribution to the 
France–Spain interconnection via the Bay of Biscay, which is currently under construction (European 
Commission 2018b). In addition, project promoters of PCIs can apply for the European Investment 
Bank’s (EIB) European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) scheme. The EFSI finances up to 50 per 
cent of project costs and provides preferential loans.15 In particular, the fund’s central objective is to 
trigger additional financing from private investors encouraged by the EIB’s approval for the project 
(Interview 15). The CEF and EFSI can be combined and cover a project’s feasibility studies, planning, 
and construction. The EU financial support instruments described give TSOs a very strong incentive to 
focus on getting their projects onto the PCI list, in order secure the additional funding and preferential 
financing (Interview 10). Moreover, the PCI status is connected to an accelerated permitting process, a 
streamlined environmental impact assessment, and simpler regulations (European Commission 
2018d). These measures can potentially shorten a transmission project’s permitting procedure from an 
average of 10 years to three and a half years, a political and financial benefit for TSOs (European 
Commission 2017a). From a business perspective, a project labelled as a PCI is an enormously 
advantageous investment opportunity for a TSO.  
In addition, the PCI status enables project promoters to invoke the overruling of public interest, 
potentially stifling local environmental concerns and further streamlining the permitting process (see 
below). Ultimately, the PCI label is linked to a certain prestige for the promoting TSO vis-à-vis private 
investors and the respective NRA and national government (Interviews 9, 10, 13, 15). Hence, in general 
during the TYNDP development, TSOs have strong incentives for their projects to be part of the project 
list to qualify for the subsequent PCI selection process. Environmental protection interest groups are 
also aware of the TYNDP’s significance for the PCI selection. For instance, due to the streamlined 
permission process and the possibility of overruling public interest, PCI projects can be permitted to 
have a bigger environmental impact than regular electricity infrastructure projects.16 Moreover, once the 
PCI status is granted to a project, opposing its construction becomes more challenging due to its 
certified relevance for the European energy system. As a result, environmental groups are closely 
monitoring the TYNDP process and trying to influence its project list in view of the subsequent PCI 
selection (Interviews 13, 14). 
To summarize, the utilization of the TYNDP and its scenarios revolves around the interconnection with 
national network development plans and the strong link to the PCIs. In particular, this section has shown 
that the TYNDP’s importance for EU energy policy is based in its close connection to the PCI selection 
process. Consequently, the European Commission, as the central promoter of a European electricity 
policy, seeks to utilize the TYNDP to facilitate the achievement of the respective EU policy goals through 
key infrastructure investments.  
 
                                                     
 
15 For the Italy–France electricity interconnector, for example, the EFSI provided a €130 million loan over a term of 22 years 
with a fixed interest rate of 1.64%, EIB 2017. 
16 For example, the hydro-pumped electricity storage project in Kaunertal, Austria (PCI no. 2.18) would have negative effects on 
a Natura 2000 protected area (Interview 13).  
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6. Results 
Section 4 has revealed, in the TYNDP scenarios, a significant congruence with EU energy policy goals. 
In addition, the strong link between the TYNDP and the PCI selection process has been illustrated. The 
analysis has shown that these two aspects are closely connected. To elaborate, the common critical 
denominator for all three pillars of European electricity policy – a competitive market, the mitigation of 
climate change, and a secure supply – is the construction of cross-border transmission lines (see 
Section 3). The PCIs are the European Commission’s central policy tool to facilitate investments in 
these key infrastructure projects. Finally, the function of ENTSO-E’s TYNDP is to bridge the EU policy 
goals and the PCIs. In particular, the projects included in the TYNDP effectively all contribute to EU 
goals and, as a consequence, PCIs are selected from the TYNDP project list using the same cost–
benefit analysis.  
The analysis gives rise to questions for both the TYNDP’s ability to identify future challenges in the 
European electricity system and for the effectiveness of the PCI selection process in allocating 
infrastructure investments.  
The policy congruence and strong link with the PCI selection process results in the TYNDP being 
exclusively focused on the hardware component of the future European electricity system. This is 
reinforced by the setting of the TYNDP process. To illustrate, the key actors in the development are 
TSOs who are naturally keen on constructing more infrastructure and can benefit from the incentives 
attached to the PCI status. At the same time, regulatory and market aspects represented through ACER 
have a very limited role in the TYNDP, as the agency only gives a non-binding opinion at the very end 
of the development process (Interviews 17, 18). 
The unilateral focus on infrastructure raises the question of the TYNDP’s effectiveness in achieving its 
objectives. On the one hand, the plan identifies future challenges and infrastructure investment needs 
as part of its self-proclaimed goals (ENTSO-E 2018d). On the other hand, the TYNDP does not 
acknowledge the underlying, and currently inadequate, European electricity market design. For 
instance, the current TYNDP’s CBA methodology does not consider the impact of national capacity 
markets. At the same time, the capability of the current European electricity market design to incentivize 
dispatchable generation is questioned in the TYNDP itself (ENTSO-E 2018d). This limits the TYNDP’s 
effectiveness as a planning tool, since the hardware of an interconnected electricity system is closely 
linked to its software component. To elaborate, the software and regulation of the future European 
electricity system will be different from today’s design – it is possible to imagine a Europe-wide capacity 
mechanism or harmonized support schemes for renewable energy. However, these potential software 
developments are not reflected in the TYNDP. Nevertheless, software reforms and improved 
regulations would strongly affect the infrastructure that is required in any future European electricity 
system. To that end, the TYNDP in its current form fails to provide holistic pictures of a range of possible 
future electricity system architectures, as the decisive market designs and regulatory developments are 
not considered. As a direct consequence, the current TYNDP scenarios identify future challenges for 
the European electricity system to only a limited extent.  
The described issue associated with the TYNDP leads to the question of whether the PCI selection 
process, which draws directly from the TYNDP’s project list and cost–benefit analysis, is capable of 
allocating the necessary infrastructure investments effectively. Principally a political process 
championed by the European Commission, the PCI selection process imposes infrastructure projects 
on the European electricity market which, in its current form, is effectively broken (see Section 3.1). For 
example, the considerable financial support provided by the EU in form of the CEF illustrates that the 
present market design is flawed. In fact, in its own capacity the electricity market does not provide the 
necessary economic incentives for TSOs to invest in these key infrastructure projects. To that end, the 
PCIs potentially promote politically motivated outcomes and may underestimate economic or 
technological aspects. Similar to the TYNDP, this points to a problem in which the underlying current 
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and future market structures and regulations are not considered. Consequently, potentially deficient 
investment decisions are being taken.  
A potential solution to the stated problems is two-fold. First, a fundamental reform of the European 
electricity market design is needed. An effective market architecture would need to factor in capacity 
mechanisms and renewable support schemes, in order to provide the correct price signals and 
incentives for infrastructure investments. With a working market mechanism in place, the economic 
incentives to invest in PCIs could be strengthened. As a result, key interconnections would be located 
where the economic need is greatest, for instance where substantial cross-border price differences or 
congestions occur. In turn, this would provide a business case for TSOs to invest in key cross-border 
infrastructure projects and make the massive EU funding, in form of the CEF, obsolete. At the same 
time, both the preferential loans provided by the EIB and the streamlined permitting process currently 
granted to PCIs should be retained. On the one hand, this would encourage additional private 
investment and help TSOs to accelerate the investment decision process. On the other hand, a swift 
roll-out of these key projects would be guaranteed and their European significance would be 
emphasized. With regard to the TYNDP, the plan would benefit from a functioning electricity market 
template, as the software component of the future electricity system needs to be considered in its 
scenarios. In addition, the assessment of current and future infrastructure projects could be based on 
a functioning market design that is already in place.  
Second, and complementary to the first measure, a pan-European regulation of the electricity system 
is necessary. By strengthening the role of ACER and developing the agency into a European regulator, 
measures such as harmonized renewables support schemes and a European capacity mechanism can 
be achieved. Therefore, the agency would need to be equipped with more far-reaching competences 
to be capable of devising binding pan-European electricity market regulations. ACER could then act as 
an arbiter and coordinator, to ensure that crucial infrastructure investments like the PCIs are allocated 
effectively.17 A stronger role for ACER would then also be reflected in the TYNDP. By assuming a more 
proactive role and engaging at an earlier stage of the development process, ACER would ensure that 
the software component of the future electricity system is incorporated into the TYNDP process. For 
instance, the agency could pool and reconcile the positions of NRAs in order to account for the different 
possible electricity market designs and future regulations in the TYNDP scenarios.  
The combination of the two proposed measures would significantly improve the effectiveness of the 
combined TYNDP and PCI processes by accounting for the software component in the future electricity 
system and by allocating key infrastructure projects on the basis of economic and technical 
requirements.    
Ultimately, in terms of the TYNDP scenario design, the analysis has illustrated that the TYNDP’s policy 
congruence confines the developed scenarios. This can have a negative impact on the ability of these 
scenarios to identify essential uncertainties in the future development of the energy system. As a 
consequence, the TYNDP’s effectiveness as a strategic planning tool is further limited. In order to 
determine these uncertainties and the connected challenges more effectively, two different 
improvements to the current TYNDP design are conceivable. First, the range of the developed 
scenarios could be extended so that, for example, disruptive technologies and their impact on the 
electricity infrastructure can be accounted for (Interview 16). This could include, but is not limited to, the 
large-scale application of fracking, a breakthrough in carbon capture and storage/usage technologies 
(CCS/CCU), or peer-to-peer electricity trading. The second improvement would entail a stronger focus 
on the most critical system challenges associated with the envisioned policy goals. For example, it 
would be possible to ask: how would a renewables share in electricity generation of close to 100 per 
cent in 2050 (European Commission 2011) impact the operation of the current system? At what pace 
                                                     
 
17 The European Commission’s proposal to strengthen the role of ACER, articulated in the Clean Energy Package, is a first step 
into the proposed direction. 
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would renewables capacity need to be added? And, what would that mean for the operation of the 
system in 10, 15, and 20 years? By answering these and similar questions within the TYNDP 
framework, a better identification of the most significant future challenges would be possible and 
investment needs could be devised accordingly, in order to meet the future policy goals.  
 
7. Conclusion 
The investigation has illustrated that although the development of the TYNDP is a technical process 
driven by ENTSO-E and TSOs, the developed scenarios and their implications for European network 
development have to be understood in a wider political context. To elaborate, the scenarios across the 
analysed TYNDPs are congruent with existing EU policy goals. In other words, the range of scenario 
assumptions is confined by political expectations about the future development of the European energy 
sector. This is particularly visible in the scenarios’ assumptions on the future share of electricity from 
renewable sources, reduction of CO2 emissions, and increased interconnectivity in Europe. In addition, 
future electricity transmission and storage projects in the TYNDP are assessed for their contribution to 
EU policy goals.  
The outlined policy congruence is closely connected to the way in which policymakers and stakeholders 
utilize the TYNDP. In this regard, the TYNDP’s relevance for the PCI selection process stands out, as 
it constitutes the first step in the process of identifying key pan-European electricity transmission and 
storage projects. As a consequence, the European Commission is particularly attentive and engaged 
in the TYNDP development process. Having in mind the subsequent PCI selection process, the EC 
comprehends the TYNDP as being a first step in facilitating the realization of EU energy policy goals 
through infrastructure investments. Moreover, environmental protection groups and TSOs are also 
aware of the TYNDP’s pertinence for the PCI process and the resulting impact on the financing, 
permitting, and prestige of future infrastructure projects. The second consequence of the described 
policy congruence is an exclusive focus on the hardware component of the future European electricity 
system within the TYNDP and PCI framework. As the hardware and software aspects of any given 
electricity system are closely interlinked and will impact each other, an effective modelling of plausible 
future European electricity systems is not feasible by focusing solely on infrastructure projects. To 
elaborate, an evolution of European electricity market design – for instance the integration of 
harmonized renewables support schemes or a European capacity mechanism – is not considered in 
the current TYNDP architecture. Nevertheless, these software reforms would have a significant impact 
on the infrastructure system requirements. As a consequence, the TYNDP fails to provide a holistic 
picture of the future European electricity system and gives only a limited indication of the related future 
challenges.  
The analysis has ascertained a similar issue for the PCI process. The PCIs are key infrastructure 
projects that are being imposed on a European electricity market that is highly ineffective in providing 
the correct price signals and encouraging investment. Since the underlying market design is not capable 
of giving economic incentives for TSOs to invest in these projects, strong EU financial support is 
provided. Hence, the PCI selection is a politically motivated process championed by the Commission, 
which risks underestimating economic and technological aspects since the fundamental market failures 
are not addressed.  
In order to address these issues, this research suggests two measures. First, a fundamental reform of 
the European electricity market design is needed. An effective market architecture would need to factor 
in capacity mechanisms and renewables support schemes, in order to provide correct price signals and 
incentives for infrastructure investments. This would allow for a more effective allocation of key 
infrastructure investments. In addition, the TYNDP process would benefit from a functioning electricity 
market template, as the software component of the future electricity system needs to be considered in 
its scenarios. This, in turn, could be achieved through a more active and earlier involvement of ACER, 
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which would enable the inclusion of different plausible future market designs and European regulatory 
aspects. This leads up to the second measure, namely the stronger regulation of the electricity system 
at EU level by transforming ACER into a European regulator. Outfitted with appropriate competences, 
the agency would be capable of introducing, among other measures, European capacity mechanisms 
and harmonized renewables support schemes, thereby contributing to the functioning of the European 
electricity market. In addition, ACER could act as an arbiter, acting to guard key infrastructure 
investments, on the basis of system needs and facilitated by economic incentives. Ultimately, a stronger 
institutional position for ACER would go hand in hand with its improved engagement in the TYNDP 
process and facilitate the integration of the software component into the scenarios. In turn, this would 
improve the TYNDP’s effectiveness as a strategic planning tool for Europe’s future electricity system.    
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Conducted interviews  
Interview 1, TSO, November 2016 
Interview 2, TSO, December 2016 
Interview 3, TSO, January 2017 
Interview 4, TSO, January 2017 
Interview 5, TSO, January 2017 
Interview 6, TSO, January 2017 
Interview 7, TSO, March 2017 
Interview 8, TSO, March 2017 
Interview 9, TSO, April 2017 
Interview 10, TSO, May 2017 
Interview 11, TSO, May 2017 
Interview 12, Environmental Protection Association, September 2017 
Interview 13, Environmental Protection Association, October 2017 
Interview 14, Environmental Protection Association, October 2017 
Interview 15, EIB, November 2017 
Interview 16, Electrical Equipment Manufacturer Association, February 2018 
Interview 17, ACER, May 2018 
Interview 18, NRA, September 2018 
Interview 19, EC DG Energy, September 2018 
Interview 20, EC DG Energy, October 2018 
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